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Abstract
Penelitian ini bertujuan menguji pengaruh struktur kepemilikan dan aktivitas 
dewan terhadap pengungkapan sukarela. Struktur kepemilikan diproksikan proporsi 
kepemilikian di luar kepemilikan manajer dan institusional, sedangkan aktivitas dewan 
diproksikan tiga jenis rapat yaitu frekuensi rapat dewan direksi, frekuensi rapat dewan 
komisaris, frekuensi rapat komite audit.  Sample  studi ini adalah 109 perusahaan yang 
mempublikasikan laporan tahunan pada tahun 2009 dan 2010 yang diperoleh melalui 
purposive sampling. Pengujian hipotesis dengan menggunakan regresi berganda Hasil 
penelitian menunjukkan bahwa frekuensi rapat dewan direksi serta rapat komisaris dan 
ukuran perusahaan  mempunyai pengaruh terhadap pengungkapan sukarela. Kepemilikan 
publik dan frekuensi rapat komite audit tidak berpengaruh ke pengungkapan sukarela. 
Struktur kepemilikan dan aktivitas dewan secara bersama-sama menunjukkan pengaruh 
ke pengungkapan sukarela.   
Kata Kunci: struktur kepemilikan, aktivitas dewan dan pengungkapan sukarela
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INTRODUCTION
In the modern economy, there are 
separation between the management as 
the manager of the company and   owners 
of the company’s capital (Arifin, 2004). 
Separation of ownership and management 
will bring a known as agency problem 
because the interests of owners (principals) 
and managers (agents) are not in line. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) states that the 
agency problems  is cause the desire of the 
agent to maximize his welfare compare 
with  the welfare of the principal.
Investors (the principal) as the party 
authorized the management to manage the 
property have an interest to  improving 
their  welfare through the return of their 
capital. While the management have  an 
interest in improving  his welfare through 
incentives (Ujiyantho and Pramuka, 2007). 
This condition causes the management tend 
not to provide information that adversely 
affect those interests. This condition raises 
the asymmetry of information. Information 
asymmetry between management 
(agent) and owner (principal) provides 
an opportunity for managers to act 
opportunistically, like personal gain (Tanor, 
2009). The sufficient disclosure can reduce 
information asymmetry.
Barako (2007) shows that information 
asymmetry can be minimized with the 
transparency of corporate information. 
Given the demands of presenting 
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information in a transparent manner, it is 
expected to prevent opportunistic actions 
of management for their personal use. 
Form of transparency is the disclosure 
of the company’s annual report. The 
annual report is an important means of 
communicating financial information 
and non-financial companies. The annual 
report is also a major tool for managers 
to demonstrate  effectiveness of achieving 
accountability for the efficient functioning 
of the organization (Suripto, 1998).
Disclosure  in annual reports can be 
grouped into two categories, namely 
mandatory disclosure and  voluntary 
disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is 
a disclosure required by applicable 
regulations. Voluntary disclosure is a 
disclosure by companies beyond what 
is required in the mandatory disclosure 
(Barako, 2007). Voluntary disclosure is one 
way to increase the credibility of corporate 
financial reporting and to assist investors 
in understanding the company’s business 
strategy (Yularto and Chariri, 2003).
Disclosure is an important attribute of 
corporate governance, particularly in 
relation to the principles of transparency 
and accountability (Benardi, Sutrisno, and 
Assih, 2009). Syakhroza (2002) in a study of 
application of the OECD (Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development) 
defines corporate governance is a system 
used to direct and control board as well 
as supervise (directing, controlling, 
and Supervising) the management of 
organizational resources in an efficient, 
effective, economical, and productive to the 
principles of transparency, accountability, 
responsibility, independence, and fairness 
in order to achieve organizational goals. 
Arifin and Rachmawati (2006) stated that 
shareholders right to get the information 
timely  and the company must disclose the 
information. Applied of good corporate 
governance will provide better disclosure 
(mandatory or voluntary) accurately and 
timely.
Several studies of corporate governance 
with many different variables, gives 
different results, for example Ho and Wong 
(2001) stated that  corporate governance 
had positive effects  on  voluntary 
disclosure in Hongkong. Eng and Mak 
(2003) proved that ownership structure and 
board composition had positive effects on 
voluntary disclosure  in Singapore. Yuen et 
al (2009) that research in China, showed 
that the individual ownership, the existence 
of audit committees, company size, and the 
leverage effect on voluntary disclosure, 
while concentrated ownership, institutional 
ownership, managerial ownership, the 
proportion of independent commissioners, 
the presence of the CEO as a director and 
commissioner, profitability, and industry 
type had no effect on voluntary disclosure 
in China.
Akhtaruddin et al (2009) states that 
in Malaysia, there are positive effects 
of corporate governance factors that 
are representated by the number of 
directors, the proportion of independent 
non-executive, family control, foreign 
shareholders, and the percentage of 
voluntary audit committee disclosure. In 
Indonesia, Khomsiyah (2003) showed that 
there is a positive relationship between the 
index of the level of corporate governance 
and disclosure but Hapsoro (2007) showed 
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that ownership structure does not affect the 
transparency of information.
This study develops  Akhtaruddin et al 
(2009) and change  corporate governance 
variables base on Kanagaretnam et al (2007). 
This research differs from Akhtaruddin et 
al (2009) in the following aspects: (1) using 
the population of manufacturing companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (2) 
the use of voluntary disclosure items from 
Akhtaruddin et al (2009) which has been 
adapted to the regulations in Indonesia as 
PSAK at July 31, 2009 and BAPEPAM 
KEP-134/BL/2006 numbers that 
correspond to implemented in Indonesia 
and has expanded with added items that 
Corporate Social Responsibility sourced 
from the Global Reporting Initiative, and 
(3) the period of this study is two years, 
2009-2010.
This study aims to determine the effect 
of corporate governance on voluntary 
disclosure. Corporate governance in this 
study are representated by ownership 
structure and board activity. Ownership 
structure variable , base on Akhtaruddin 
et al (2009) and  activities of the board 
variable in accordance with Kanagaretnam 
et al (2007). This research is expected to 
provide benefit and input for the company 
to increase voluntary disclosure, may 
provide benefits for investors to consider 
their investment decisions and is expected 
to provide information and reference 
material for interested parties.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES
Agency theory
Agency theory is a theory that regarding 
the contractual relationship between two 
parties, namely the principal and agent. The 
owner of the company’s capital or investor 
(the principal) appoints the management 
(agent) to manage the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Management is vested 
in the policy decision that is expected to 
optimize the management of existing 
resources to the maximum owners’ welfare. 
Agency theory states that each party (the 
principal and agent) is only motivated by 
self-interest, increase to conflicts of interest 
between the principal and the agent.
The condition, had   known as the 
agency conflict and information 
asymmetry between owners of capital and 
management. Under these circumstances, 
it takes a system of good governance in the 
firms that aim to encourage an open and 
accountable management so owners have 
the opportunity to review these decisions 
and the basis for decision making, and 
assess the effectiveness of management 
decisions (Arifin and Rachmawati, 2006).
Corporate governance emphasized on two 
things, first, the importance of shareholders’ 
rights to obtain information correctly and on 
time and, second, the company’s obligation 
to make disclosure  accurately, timely, and 
transparent for all the information the 
company’s performance, ownership, and 
stakeholders (Kaihatu, 2006). Through 
good corporate governance that promote 
transparency of information is expected 
to provide confidence in managing the 
wealth of the owners of capital, so as to 
minimize the agency conflict (Gantyowati 
and Nurlinda, 2011).
Information asymmetry occurs because the 
manager of a firm have more information 
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about the company’s operations and future 
prospects of the company than the owner 
(Sundjaja and Barlian, 2003) Signaling 
theory arise because of the asymmetry of 
this inforrmasi. Manager as the manager of 
a company that knows a lot more internal 
information, shall provide a signal about 
the state of the company to the owner 
(Ujiyantho and Boy Scouts, 2007). Given 
signal can be done through the disclosure 
of information, one with a voluntary 
disclosure. 
Disclosure 
Disclosure is an important tool to reduce 
information asymmetry between managers 
with the company owner. Three concepts 
of the disclosure in general are  adequate, 
fair and full disclosure (Hendriksen and 
Brenda, 2001). Adequate disclosure is 
the minimum disclosures required by the 
regulations, where investor can interpret the 
figures in the financial statements properly. 
Fair disclosure contains ethical goals by 
providing appropriate information to the 
reader (investor) potential. Full disclosure 
is a disclosure of all relevant information.
Disclosure can be grouped into two 
types, namely  mandatory disclosure  and 
voluntary disclosure. Mandatory disclosure 
is the minimum disclosure required by 
applicable accounting standards and the 
Board of Supervisors (Hananto, 2009) in this 
case Bapepam-LK. Voluntary disclosure 
is a voluntary disclosure through annual 
reports exceeds the mandatory requirement 
(Barako, 2007).
Voluntary disclosure is a disclosure made 
by the management of an enterprise 
beyond the information items required to 
be disclosed under applicable rules. Meek 
et al (1995) in Fitriany (2001) showed that 
voluntary disclosure is a disclosure-free, 
where management can choose the type of 
information considered relevant to decision 
making for those users.
Corporate Governance
Syakhroza (2002) in a study of application 
of the OECD (Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development) defines 
corporate governance is a system used to 
direct and control board as well as supervise 
(directing, controlling, and supervising) the 
management of organizational resources 
in an efficient, effective, economical, and 
productive to the principles of transparent, 
accountable, Responsible, independent, and 
fairness in order to achieve organizational 
goals. 
Corporate governance is a way to ensure 
that management act in the best interests 
of stakeholders. Corporate governance 
is a system that definitively regulate 
and control the enterprise to create 
added value for all stakeholders. There 
are five major components required 
in corporate governance, namely 
fairness, transparency, accountability, 
responsibility and independency. 
Implementation of corporate governance 
helps to reduce the information asymmetry 
between agents and principals through 
disclosure. Disclosure provide strong 
protection for the rights of shareholders 
(owners of capital), especially minority 
shareholders. The practice of disclosure 
is well supported by the existence of good 
corporate governance practices as well. 
This research was supported by Ho and 
Wong (2001) that states the application of 
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corporate governance has a broad impact 
on corporate disclosure.
One element of corporate governance is used 
in the study : the ownership structure. The 
selection of variables  base on Akhtaruddin 
et al (2009). Ownership structure is an 
entity or individual who holds shares in a 
company (Wahyudi and Pawestri, 2006). 
Ownership structure reflects the distribution 
of power and influence among shareholders 
over the company’s operations. Ownership 
structure in this research is identified as 
the proportion of public ownership outside 
managerial and institutional.
Meanwhile, other elements of corporate 
governance is the activity of the board. 
Board activity is the amount of the 
company’s board and audit committee meets 
for one year (Gantyowati and Dewi, 2011). 
Activity can be seen from the frequency of 
executive board meetings, the frequency 
of non-executive board meetings, and the 
frequency of audit committee meetings.
Firm Characteristics
Firm characteristics are specific 
characteristics inherent in the company, 
marking a company and distinguish it 
from other companies. Characteristics 
of enterprise can be the size of the firm, 
number of shareholders, leverage, liquidity 
ratio, the base of the company, profile, and 
other characteristics (Marwata, 2006). Firm 
characteristics that used in this study is the 
size of the company. Size of the company 
is an important variable that explains the 
extensive disclosure in annual reports 
(Cooke, 1992).
Hypothesis
Influence the structure of public 
ownership outside of the managerial and 
institutional voluntary disclosure.
Increased public ownership serves to 
monitor the performance of managers and 
reduce the possibility of storing information 
manager for private purposes (Akhtaruddin 
et al, 2009). Research Susanto (1992) states 
that the higher the stock ownership by 
the community led to the higher pressure 
to provide better disclosure, including 
voluntary disclosure.
H1: The proportion of public ownership 
influence on voluntary disclosure.
Influence the frequency of executive 
board meetings of the voluntary 
disclosure.
The frequency of executive board meetings 
reflect the higher duties that the executive 
boards have managed the company 
properly and protect the rights of corporate 
stakeholders. The executive board as the 
company’s management tried to meet 
the demands of the stakeholders about 
company information with increasing their 
meetings frequency which will address 
the issues that will affect the stakeholders 
(Gantyowati and Dewi, 2011).
H2: The frequency of executive board 
meetings influence on the voluntary 
disclosure.
Influence the frequency of non executive 
board meetings of the voluntary 
disclosure.
According to Xie (2003), the more 
frequently non executive board meetings, 
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the supervisory function is becoming 
increasing effectively. The frequency 
of non executive board meetings can 
effectively monitor the management so 
as to encourage managers to give greater 
disclosure to their stakeholders (Conger, 
1998; Brick and Chidambaram 2007)
H3: The frequency of non executive 
board meetings influence on the voluntary 
disclosure.
Influence the frequency of audit committee 
meetings to the voluntary disclosure. 
Collier and Gregory (1999) revealed that 
the frequency of audit committee meetings 
are held more often, provide mechanisms 
for oversight and monitoring activities 
more effective management, Thus, the 
Audit Committee meetings are more 
frequent, may increase the effectiveness 
of management and may increase 
the company’s voluntary disclosure. 
H4: The frequency of audit committee 
meetings influence on voluntary 
disclosure.
Influence of ownership structure and 
board activity on voluntary disclosure 
Base on the description of the development 
of hypotheses 1 to 4, it can be concluded 
that the ownership structure and board 
activity jointly influence on   voluntary 
disclosure.
H5: ownership structure and board activity 
influence on voluntary disclosure all 
together
RESEARCH METHOD
Independent Variables
The proportion of public ownership 1. 
beyond the managerial and institutional 
ownership indicates the percentage of 
people outside of the managerial and 
institutional ownership. Variables are 
consistent with the Akhtaruddin et al 
(2009).
The frequency of executive board 2. 
meetings is the number of board 
meetings held during the year. The 
executive board shall conduct regular 
meetings and additional meetings if 
deemed necessary in order to carry 
out their duties effectively (Corporate 
Governance Guideliness, 2007). 
Variables are consistent with the 
Kanagaretnam et al (2007).
The frequency of non-executive board 3. 
meetings is the number of board meetings 
held during the year. The non-executive 
board must conduct regular meetings and 
additional meetings if deemed necessary 
(Corporate Governance Guideliness, 
2007). Variables are consistent with the 
Kanagaretnam et al (2007).
Audit committee meeting frequency is 4. 
the number of audit committee meetings 
held during the year. The audit committee 
should conduct periodic meetings and 
additional meetings if deemed necessary 
and audit committee meetings should be 
run at least four times a year in order 
to carry out their duties effectively 
(Corporate Governance Guideliness, 
2007). Variables base on Kanagaretnam 
et al (2007).
Dependent Variable
Dependent variable in this study is 
voluntary disclosure. The measurement 
of voluntary disclosure is disclosure index 
which derived from Akhtaruddin et al 
research (2009) and had adjusted by PSAK 
per July 31, 2009 and BAPEPAM No: KEP-
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134/BL/2006, and coupled with Corporate 
items Social Responsibility, which is a 93 
item disclosure. This index is calculated by 
giving a score of 1 if there is disclosure and 
a score of 0 if no. Of the total score will be 
divided by the highest score when all the 
disclosures made.
Control variable
We use Firm size to control factor that 
can affect the disclosure. Firm size is 
measured by log of total assets owned by 
the company. Methods of data analysis in 
this research using descriptive statistics and 
hypothesis testing with multiple regression 
analysis in which statistical analysis using 
SPSS released 17. Regression equation for 
hypothesis testing in this study are:
Y = a + bX1 + cX2 + dX3 + eX4 + fX5+ ε
Description:
Y   = voluntary disclosure item score 
/ highest score when all items 
available
X1  = the proportion of public 
ownership beyond the managerial 
and institutional
X2  = the frequency of executive board 
meetings
X3  = the frequency of non-executive 
board meetings
X4  = the frequency of audit committee 
meetings
X5  = log of assets
a  = constant
b, c, d, e, f = coefficient of regression
ε  = error
This study includes firms listed on The 
Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) in the end of 
2009 and 2010. This study uses a purposive 
sampling technique. There are  292 
companies listed on the Stock Exchange, 
and only 109 companies fill sample 
requirement: they publish annual reports in 
2009 and 2010 and their annual reports will 
be accessible and provide the required data 
in the study.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics data. 
The average manufacturing firm reveal 
items of voluntary disclosure is equal to 
0.4395 or 43.95%. The minimum value of 
voluntary disclosure is 0.16 or 16% of the 
93 disclosure items. While the maximum 
value of voluntary disclosure is 0.75 or 
75% of the 93 disclosure items.
Meanwhile, the minimum value for a 
variable proportion of public ownership 
beyond the managerial and institutional 
amounted to 0.26% and its maximum value 
by 68%. Lowest frequency of executive 
board meetings is 2 times a year and 
the highest is 52 times a year. The mean 
frequency of executive board meetings is 
18.34 or 18 times a year.
Sample of 109 manufacturing firms, the 
average frequency of non executive board 
meetings are at 7.38 or 7 times a year. Non 
executive board meetings with the lowest 
frequency is 1 times in one year. While 
the highest frequency of the non executive 
board meetings is 65 times a year. Lowest 
frequency of audit committee meetings is 
a once a year and the highest is 41 times 
a year. The mean frequency of audit 
committee meetings are at 6.43 or 6 times 
a year.
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Firm size  is a control variable in this study. 
Firm size is represented by the logarithm 
of firm assets. The size of the smallest 
companies amounted to 10 and the size of 
the largest companies amounted to 14.43. 
The average size of the company amounted 
to 12.25.
Hypothesis Testing
The results of  hypothesis testing show that 
the frequency of executive board meetings, 
non executive board meeting frequency, 
and size affect the company’s voluntary 
disclosure. The proportion of public 
ownership or audit committee meetings 
frequency, in the other side has no effect 
on voluntary disclosure.
Based on individual parameter significance 
test (t test), it reveals that the probability 
of executive board meeting frequency of 
0.004 is smaller than 0.05, it indicates the 
frequency of executive board meetings has 
impact on the voluntary disclosure. Non 
executive board meeting frequency has a 
significance value 0.03   less than  0.05. 
Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. De-viation
Volunt.Disclosure 109 0.16 0.75 0.4395 0.10132
Prop.PublicOwnership 109 0.26 68.00 22.3306 15.52034
ExecutiveBoardMeeting 109 2 52 18.34 13.315
NonExecutiveBoardMeeting 109 1 65 7.38 8.411
AuditCommitteeMeeting 109 1 41 6.43 5.496
LogAsset 109 10.00 14.43 12.2470 0.82685
Source: Data Processing Results
Table 2.
Multiple Regression Results
Variables Coefficients t Sig
Volunt.Disclosure 0.000 0.610 0.543
Prop.PublicOwnership 0.002 2.905 0.004
ExecutiveBoardMeeting 0.003 2.200 0.030
NonExecutiveBoardMeeting -0.002 -0.806 0.422
AuditCommitteeMeeting 0.043 3.963 0.000
R Square 0.241
Adjusted R Square 0.204
F 6.544
Sig 0.000
Dependent Var: Volunt. Disc   
Source: Data Processing Results
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These results indicate that the frequency 
of non executive board meetings has 
significant effect on voluntary  disclosure. 
Firm size as a control variable  significantly 
affect the company’s voluntary disclosure. 
This can be seen by the t test results that 
firm size has probability value  0.000. 
The proportion of public ownership beyond 
the managerial and institutional has no 
effect on voluntary disclosure. The results 
of the t test showed that the probability for 
the proportion of public ownership beyond 
the managerial and institutional is 0.543 
greater than the probability of significance. 
Base on t test, it appears that the probability 
of an audit committee meeting frequency 
of 0.422 is greater than 0.05 indicates no 
effect on voluntary corporate disclosure.
 The F test result provides evident that 
ownership structure and activities of  boards 
have impact on the disclosure. Sig F test is 
0.000  smaller than 0.05. 
Discussion  
The frequency of executive board meetings 
has a significant effect on voluntary 
disclosure means that the board has to 
maximize its role in protecting the rights of 
shareholders is to provide full information 
to shareholders (H2 is supported). The 
meetings  of the executive board has 
made addressing the issues that will affect 
the shareholders so that management 
can be  expected to avoid the demands 
of shareholders, one of which related to 
transparency of information (Gantyowati 
and Dewi, 2011). The test results are 
consistent with studies Kanagaretnam et al 
(2007), Gantyowati and Dewi (2011).
The frequency of non executive board 
meetings effect on voluntary disclosure 
because the non executive board has 
effectively carry out its duties in overseeing 
the performance of corporate management, 
especially in terms of disclosure (H3 is 
supported). Non executive board meetings 
are conducted focusing on the transparency 
of corporate information disclosed. This 
can prevent the emergence of private 
information that harms the shareholders. 
The study is in line with  Kanagaretnam et 
al (2007), Gantyowati and Dewi (2011).
The results showed that the size affect 
the company’s voluntary disclosure. 
These results are consistent with research 
Kanagaretnam et al (2007), King et al 
(1992). According Chowen et al (1987) 
in Sembiring (2005), large companies 
will not escape from the pressures from 
their stakeholders so that the demand for 
information has also increased. Large firms 
have greater disclosure as well.
The proportion of public ownership 
beyond the managerial and institutional 
does not affect voluntary disclosure (H1 
is not supported). The proportion of public 
ownership beyond the managerial and 
institutional does not affect voluntary 
disclosure because the disclosure of public 
companies in Indonesia to disclose more 
information to the public due to concerns 
over the severe sanctions that will be 
received by the company if they violate the 
provisions required by the agency authority 
(Hapsoro, 2007). The proportion of public 
ownership beyond the managerial and 
institutional has not been able to encourage 
companies to voluntarily be more open 
in disclosing information that needs to be 
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submitted to the public. The results of this 
study support the research Hapsoro (2007) 
and Marwata (2006). However, these 
studies are inconsistent with Kanagaretnam 
et al (2007) and Aktaruddin et al (2009) 
which states that the proportion of public 
ownership has an influence on voluntary 
information.
The frequency of audit committee meetings 
has no effect on voluntary disclosure (H4 is 
not supported). It means that the frequency 
of audit committee meetings has not 
guaranteed the audit committee oversight 
functions properly and effectively, so do 
not affect the company’s performance in 
this disclosure (Gantyowati and Dewi, 
2011). The study is in line with research 
Gantyowati and Dewi (2011), but these 
studies are inconsistent with research 
Kanagaretnam et al (2007) and Xie et al 
(2003) which states that there is a positive 
relationship between the frequency of audit 
committee meetings with the disclosure of 
information.
CONCLUSION
This study aims to examine the effect of 
ownership structure and board activity 
on voluntary disclosure of manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (BEI) for the period 2009-2010. 
Voluntary disclosure is measured by the 
index of voluntary disclosure of the items 
that come from research Akhtaruddin et al 
(2009) and have been adjusted to PSAK 
July 31, 2009 and BAPEPAM No: KEP-
134/BL/2006, and coupled with the items 
Corporate Social Responsibility.
The independent variable is represented by 
the proportion of the ownership structure 
of public ownership beyond the managerial 
and institutional, while the activity of the 
board is represented by the frequency of 
executive board meetings, the frequency 
of non executive board meeting, and the 
frequency of audit committee meetings. 
Control variables using the firm’s size 
is represented by the logarithm of firm 
assets.
Based on the analysis, the results showed 
that the frequency of executive board 
meetings, the frequency of non executive 
board meeting, and firm’s size affect the 
company’s voluntary disclosure.
 The proportion of public ownership  and 
audit committee meeting frequency have 
no effect on voluntary disclosure. While 
the ownership structure, variables board 
activity,  as well as firm size as control 
variables, taken together influence the 
voluntary disclosure.
The research was carried out with some 
limitations. First, the disclosure index 
scores were assessed by researcher 
intepretation themself thus  content 
subjective interpretation. Second, this 
study uses only four independent variables 
and one control variable. Third, this 
study uses only two-year study period. 
Fourth, the research scope was limited to 
manufacturing companies in Indonesia.
Future studies should be able to reduce the 
problem of subjectivity in the judgment 
index score disclosures involving several 
researchers in assessing a company’s annual 
report sample. Subsequent research has 
suggested to increase the number of other 
independent variables,  add other  type of 
industries and may extend the period of the 
study, so we get a lot of number of samples 
and the results can be more accurately.
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